About Cryptanalysis of One Fully Homomorphic Cryptosystem Based on Factorization Problem

About Cryptanalysis of One Fully Homomorphic Cryptosystem Based on Factorization Problem

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We present a known plaintext attack (KPA) on a recently proposed fully homomorphic cryptosystem (FHC), based on the problem of big integers factoring.We show that the considered FHC is insecure against KPA 2009 buick lucerne catalytic converter even if only one pair (plaintext, ciphertext) was intercepted by an adversary.The complexity of the proposed KPA depends polynomially on the parameters of FHC and logarithmically on the size of plaintexts space.Also we discuss how ciphertexts only attack (COA) on this koleston 55/44 FHC may be reduced to KPA.